Analaysis of I think therefore I Err Epistemology cognition Essay

Analaysis of I think therefore I Err Epistemology cognition - Essay Example On the other hand, the latter is what is deemed as necessary and beneficial to the development of a given intelligent system. These good errors serve a functional role in the development of knowledge and, in turn, intelligence. It is in this regard that Gigerenzer makes â€Å"the study of human errors in experimental psychology† as his primary concern in inferring the laws of cognition (1). In his study, Gigerenzer defends an ecological versus that of a logical analysis of cognitive errors. In doing so, he claims that a proper analysis should not be based content-blind logical principles. Upon addressing the aforementioned problem, I shall deal with Gigerenzer’s analysis of the role of logic with regards to the workings of the human mind and intelligence. Specifically, I shall focus on his claim on logic as â€Å"a content-blind norm for good reasoning† (7). Herein, I shall argue that his analysis of the role of logic as a purely syntactic and content-blind theor y is mistaken. Like Daniel Kahneman and Amon Tversky, I agree that not all judgments can be analyzed by using empirical methods such as sampling and frequency estimates, for such are â€Å"unlikely to illuminate the processes that underlie such judgments† (589). Rather, I shall argue that Gigerenzer overlooks an important aspect of logic, that is, the intensional aspect of logic. By doing so, I shall focus on his explication of framing and invariance. In this essay, I intend to advocate the value of logic from an intensional point of view. In doing so, I shall show that Gigerenzer fails to prove that the study of cognitive errors in the light of logical forms of analyses fail to unravel the laws of mind. Summary In a section entitled, â€Å"Logic and Blunders,† Gigerenzer argues against the position of using logical theories as a foundation for analyzing and comparing the presence of errors in judgment, and thus, fails to define what really â€Å"errors of judgmentâ⠂¬  are, as well as to â€Å"open a window into the human mind† (4). In other words, logic does not help us understand and gain intelligence by pointing out our errors in judgment, rather; it blurs our understanding of what these â€Å"errors† really are, and thus, fails to open the possibility for progress and evolution of the human mind as an intelligent system. Given this perspective, Gigerenzer provides an example in logic to support his point, namely, framing. â€Å"Framing is defined as the expression of logically equivalent information in different ways† (Gigerenzer 7). Similarly, according to the principle of invariance, â€Å"different representations of the same choice problem should yield the same preference. That is, the preference between options should be independent of their description† (Gigerenzer 8). Thus, if different representations of the same choice problem yield different preferences, then it violates rational choice. Such violatio ns are deemed as errors in judgment that should not happen to any rational person. Gigerenzer gives the example of two ways of saying the following: â€Å"The glass is half full, and the glass is half empty† (8). Given the principle of invariance, these two formulations should not affect the choice of the person in picking which glass to hand over. However, it was shown that when asked to hand over the â€Å"half full glass, most participants picked the previously empty one† (Gigerenzer 8). The author then claims that such an example proves to show that two